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Jesse  Tucker,  Graduate  Student,  University  of  Alabama       
  
ABOUT  THE  COMPETITION  
  The  Center  for  Homeland  Defense  and  Security  (CHDS)  announces  the  winner  and  finalists  of  its  first  annual  essay  contest.  CHDS  launched  the  contest  last  year  to  provide  people  from  around  the  country  the  opportunity  to  express  their  opinions  on  homeland  security  issues  and  to  suggest  new  ideas.  The  winner  and  four  finalists  were  selected  from  eighty  contest  submissions  by  a  committee  comprised  of  CHDS  staff,  faculty,  and  alumni.  The  variety  of  the  essay  topics  submitted,  as  well  as  the  backgrounds  of  the  authors,  highlights  the  vast  scope  of  the  impact  that  homeland  security  policies,  programs,  and  challenges  have  on  our  communities  and  professions.  This  year’s  contestants  were  asked  to  answer  the  question  “What  single  aspect  of  Homeland  Security  has  been  most  successful,  and  what  single  aspect  will  be  most  critical  to  Homeland  Security  success?”    Congratulations  to  this  year’s  winners.  We  hope  reading  their  essays  will  accomplish  the  contest  objective  of  stimulating  thoughts  and  ideas  and  promoting  discussion  and  debate  on  homeland  security  and  defense  issues.    More  information  about  the  competition,  including  the  question  and  guidelines  for  the  current  competition  and  an  archive  of  questions  and  finalist  essays  from  previous  competitions  can  be  found  at  the  following  web  address:  
http://www.chds.us/?essay/overview  
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REDUCING  THE  RISK  
Matthew  M.  Allen  
Matthew  Allen  is  a  scientist  at  Sandia  National  Laboratories.    He  is  currently  
serving   as   an   ASME   Congressional   Fellow   at   the   Committee   on   Homeland  
Security,   House   of   Representatives.   The   views   of   Matthew   Allen   do   not  
necessarily   reflect   the   views   of   any  member   or   committee   of   Congress.  Mr.  
Allen  can  be  contacted  at  mallen@sandia.gov.    
The  effective  use  of  rhetoric  in  communicating  public  policy  cannot  be  overstated.  In  democratic  governments,  elected  officials  must  be  able  to  accurately  and  (equally  as  important)  concisely  convey  their  actions  in  a  way  that  explains  both  the  problem  and  solution.  Since  the  establishment  of  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  in  2002,  the  department's  mission  has  sometimes  been  difficult  to  understand.    What  the  government  is  doing  to  protect  its  citizens  from  terrorism,  and  how  the  government  is  doing  it,  is  something  few  people  can  articulate.    Not  until  recently  has  the  administration  found  the  proper  rhetorical  tools  that  explain  both  the  challenges  the  nation  faces  with  respect  to  terrorism  and  how  the  government  is  addressing  those  challenges.  As  will  be  shown  below,  the  concept  of  “reducing  the  risk,”  more  than  any  other  aspect  of  homeland  security  policy,  will  be  critical  in  guiding  the  actions  of  policy  makers  for  years  to  come.      THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  RHETORIC  Rhetoric  can  be  defined  as  the  art  of  speaking  or  writing  effectively  or  the  use  of  speaking  and  writing  as  a  form  of  persuasion.  In  this  paper,  the  term  rhetoric  (and  rhetorical  phrase)  describes  the  use  of  language  to  communicate  a  challenge  faced  by  the  nation  and  the  means  of  meeting  that  challenge.  When  the  nation  is  threatened  by  ideological  opposition,  it  is  often  rhetorical  arguments,  in  the  form  of  catch  phrases,  that  galvanize  the  public  in  support  of  a  common  goal.    Although  these  rhetorical  phrases  can  be  sweeping  generalizations  and  may  provide  few  specifics  (if  any)  as  to  how  opposition  can  be  overcome,  such  phrases  are  useful  in  communicating  to  the  public  challenges  faced  by  the  nation.  In  February  of  1861,  Jefferson  Davis  was  elected  provisional  president  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America.  On  April  12th  of  the  same  year,  Fort  Sumter  was  attacked  and  destroyed  by  Confederate  forces  –  thus  beginning  the  Civil  War.  To  prepare  the  nation  for  war,  President  Lincoln  called  a  special  session  of  Congress  on  July  4,  1861.    In  his  statement  to  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  he  asked  the  Congress  to  legitimize  his  recent  call-­‐up  of  troops,  his  blockade  of  the  ports  of  secessionist  states,  and  his  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  Lincoln’s  justification  for  becoming  the  most  centralized  president  in  
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history  was  his  perception  that  the  president  had  a  constitutional  duty  to  “preserve  the  union.”  This  rhetorical  statement  was  direct  and  to  the  point.  It  described  the  struggle  against  secession  in  a  way  the  American  people,  the  Congress,  and  the  United  States  courts  could  easily  understand  and  support.  The  Cold  War  represented  a  similar  ideological  challenge.  George  Keenan's  1947  paper,  “The  Sources  of  Soviet  Conduct,”  gave  a  very  detailed  analysis  of  the  factors  influencing  Russian,  Communist,  and  Soviet  thinking  of  the  time.    However,  the  message  many  policy  makers  took  away  from  his  now  famous  paper  was  the  following  sentence:  In  these  circumstances  it  is  clear  that  the  main  element  of  any  United  States  policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  must  be  that  of  a  long-­‐term,  patient  but  firm  and  vigilant  containment  of  Russian  expansive  tendencies.1  Much  to  the  author’s  surprise,  this  concept  of  “containment”  became  the  foundation  of  diplomatic,  economic,  and  military  policy  toward  communist  countries  for  the  next  forty  years.2  Why  did  this  happen?  Why  was  this  one  sentence  interpreted  so  broadly?    The  answer  is  quite  simple:  It  was  excellent  rhetoric.  Much  like  Lincoln’s  mission  to  “preserve  the  union,”  Keenan’s  concept  of  containment  was  direct  and  to  the  point.    With  that  one  word,  policy  makers  could  explain  both  the  problem  (in  this  case  Russian  expansive  tendencies)  and  the  solution:  containment.  This  rhetoric  provided  a  simple  framework  to  counter  communism,  an  ideology  that  was  difficult  for  most  people  to  understand.  For  forty  years,  government  actions  were  measured  by  their  success  in  containing  the  communist  threat.  The  modern  ideological  challenge  to  the  United  States  (and  the  rest  of  the  Western  world)  is  that  of  radical  Islam.  How  do  we  counter  this  ideologically  driven  opponent  with  no  well-­‐defined  geographical  base  or  known  constituency?      At  a  recent  Congressional  hearing,  Secretary  of  Homeland  Security  Michael  Chertoff  was  asked  to  summarize  his  strategy  for  dealing  with  terrorists.  He  answered,  “In  a  nutshell  it’s:  reduce  risk...  And  we  do  it  by  looking  at  all  the  elements  in  the  chain  of  risk.”3  This  clear  and  concise  statement  described  a  framework  for  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security’s  enduring  mission.  The  simple  statement,  reducing  the  risk,  describes  both  the  problem  (we  are  at  risk)  and  the  solution:  we  must  work  to  reduce  this  risk.  This  concept  of  reducing  the  
risk,  more  than  any  other  aspect  of  homeland  security  policy,  has  succeeded  in  communicating  the  challenges  we  face;  reducing  the  risk  will  continue  to  be  the  most  critical  aspect  in  shaping  of  homeland  security  policy.  THE  FORMALISM  OF  RISK  While  the  rhetorical  statement,  reducing  the  risk,  may  be  simple,  the  definition  of  risk  (at  first  glance)  may  appear  difficult.  The  formulation  of  risk  is  not  new  or  rare  in  either  the  private  or  public  sectors.  Engineers,  economists,  political  analysis,  and  public  health    
  Matthew  M.  Allen:  Reducing  the  Risk      2008  CHDS  Essay  Competition  Winner  
professionals  all  employ  some  method  of  risk  analysis  in  their  decision-­‐making  processes.  Academics  have  made  an  industry  out  of  quantifying  risk  and  adding  contributing  factors  to  risk  equations.      Fortunately,  although  every  field’s  understanding  of  risk  may  be  slightly  different,  the  meaning  of  risk  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  homeland  security  can  be  described  by  three  fundamental  factors:  threat,  vulnerability,  and  consequence.  What  is  more,  risk  is  the  product  of  these  terms  not  the  sum.  If  any  one  of  them  is  zero  then  the  risk  is  zero.4  Likewise,  if  any  of  the  terms  is  much  greater  than  the  others,  it  can  drive  the  risk  higher  even  when  the  other  terms  may  be  small.      Taken  together,  these  three  factors  describe  –  either  qualitatively  or  quantitatively  when  possible  –  our  nation’s  risk  with  regard  to  terrorism.  In  the  following  sections,  each  of  these  terms  is  discussed  in  relation  to  their  influence  on  terrorism  risk  assessment.  THREAT  In  the  post-­‐9/11  world,  it  is  common  to  hear  talk  regarding  the  “probability”  of  terrorism.  Probability,  however,  is  best  suited  for  naturally  occurring  phenomena  such  as  lightning  strikes,  hurricanes,  and  rain.  The  more  relevant  term  for  homeland  security  purposes  is  the  
threat  of  terrorism,  where  threat  is  a  combination  of  intent  and  capability.  The  role  intent  plays  in  threat  assessment  can  be  illustrated  by  a  comparison  of  two  homes.    On  the  one  hand,  there  is  my  mother’s  home  in  a  small  town  in  western  Pennsylvania.  Although  al-­‐Qa’ida  may  be  capable  of  blowing  up  her  home,  they  have  (as  far  as  I  know)  no  intent  to  do  so.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  my  apartment  in  Washington,  DC,  conveniently  located  between  the  U.S.  Capitol  Building  and  the  White  House.  While  I  doubt  Osama  Bin  Laden  has  my  name  on  his  list  of  targets,  my  apartment's  proximity  to  other  targets  increases  the  risk  to  my  home.  Terrorist  capability  is  the  same  in  both  cases,  but  terrorist  intent  to  cause  destruction  is  understandably  higher  in  Washington,  DC.  than  it  is  in  a  small  town  in  western  Pennsylvania.  Capability  can  be  explained  in  a  similar  manner.  The  threat  of  an  improvised  explosive  device  (IED)  such  as  those  used  in  Iraq  or  Afghanistan  is  obviously  higher  than  that  of  an  improvised  nuclear  device  (IND).  Although  al-­‐Qa’ida  has  stated  their  intent  to  acquire  and  use  nuclear  devices,  they  are  simply  not  as  capable  of  acquiring  INDs  as  they  are  of  acquiring  IEDs.  This  makes  the  threat  of  nuclear  terrorism  low  as  compared  to  the  threat  of  terrorism  by  conventional  explosives.  Does  this  mean  the  risk  of  nuclear  terrorism  is  low?  Certainly  not  –keep  reading.  VULNERABILITY  When  some  people  think  of  vulnerabilities,  they  think  of  the  impact  a  terrorist  strike  would  have  on  components  of  our  critical  infrastructure  or  key  resources.    Vulnerability  of  targets  depends  on  such  factors  as  target  hardness  or  single-­‐point  failures,  as  well  as  redundancy  and  reconstitution  capability.  A  target’s  hardness  refers  to  the  ease  or  difficulty  with  which  
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a  terrorist  attack  could  be  effectively  accomplished.  A  critical  facility  with  a  firm  structure  and  guards  at  the  entrance  is  harder  to  attack  than  one  with  multiple  points  of  access  and  no  guards  at  the  door.    Some  systems  are  vulnerable  due  to  single-­‐point  failures.  Our  nation’s  aging  electrical  grid  is  a  prime  example.  In  August  of  2003,  the  shutdown  of  one  power  plant  in  Northern  Ohio  caused  an  electrical  blackout  throughout  much  of  the  American  Northeast.  Single-­‐point  failures  are  also  common  in  transit  systems  and  production  facilities.  It  is  the  wide-­‐spread  nature  of  this  problem  that  makes  it  such  a  great  vulnerability.  Options  for  mitigating  single-­‐point  failures  are  built-­‐in  redundancy  and  the  ability  to  reconstitute  a  capability  if  it  were  lost.    Alternatively,  the  absence  of  redundancy  and  reconstitution  capability  is  a  further  vulnerability.    CONSEQUENCE  Consequence  is  the  one  risk  factor  that  —  with  a  few  assumptions  –  can  be  quantified    A  successful  terrorist  attack  would  result  in  the  loss  of  life  and/or  property  –  both  things  that  are  relatively  easy  to  correlate  with  geographical  regions.  This  allows  us  to  compare  the  consequence  of  different  types  of  terrorist  attacks  and  the  consequence  of  similar  attacks  at  different  locations.  A  powerful  car  bomb,  for  example,  would  have  different  levels  of  consequence  in  a  small  town  in  western  Pennsylvania  than  the  same  size  bomb  would  have  in  New  York  City.  Although  the  destructive  force  of  the  bomb  might  be  similar,  a  successful  attack  in  New  York  City  –  with  the  highest  population  density  in  the  country  and  the  nation's  third  largest  economy  –  would  have  much  higher  consequence.  Quantifying  consequence  in  this  way  also  allows  us  to  rank  the  risk  of  various  forms  of  attack.  Weapons  that  claim  many  lives  and  destroy  a  lot  of  property  naturally  have  greater  consequence.  This  is  what  drives  the  risk  of  nuclear  terrorism.  As  discussed  above,  the  threat  of  nuclear  terrorism  may  be  low,  but  the  consequence  of  the  successful  detonation  of  a  nuclear  device  in  an  urban  area  would  be  catastrophic,  resulting  in  thousands  of  fatalities  and  tens  of  billions  of  dollars  in  damage.  This  level  of  catastrophic  consequence  is  what  makes  the  risk  of  nuclear  terrorism  high,  even  though  the  threat  may  be  low.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  consequence  is  the  summation  (not  the  product)  of  loss  of  life  and  property.  It  is  possible  to  imagine  a  terrorist  attack  that  claims  only  life  and  leaves  infrastructure  intact  (such  as  the  Sarin  gas  attacks  in  Tokyo's  subway  in  1995)  or  an  attack  that  claims  no  lives  but  has  dire  economic  consequences  (such  as  the  detonation  of  a  dirty  bomb)  by  disrupting  service  or  denying  access  to  critical  infrastructure.  UTILIZING  RHETORIC  With  the  above  formalism,  we  have  answered  the  question  of  how  to  confront  the  ideological  threat  of  terrorism:  by  reducing  the  risk.  However,  this  is  not  enough.    While  rhetoric  is  an  effective  means  of  galvanizing  the  public,  rhetoric  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  indefinitely  sustain  public  support.  Public  support  can  only  maintained  by  implementing  effective  policy  that  is  accompanied  by  demonstrable  success.      
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The  next  logical  question  we  must  ask  is:  how  do  we  measure  success?  Surely,  no  one  believes  that  the  risk  of  terrorism  can  ever  be  reduced  to  zero.  Even  the  current  administration  feels  we  will  never  reach  a  terrorism-­‐free  environment.  The  National  
Strategy  for  Homeland  Security  states:  Recognizing  that  the  future  is  uncertain  and  that  we  cannot  envision  or  prepare  for  every  potential  threat,  we  must  understand  and  accept  a  certain  level  of  risk  as  a  permanent  condition.5    If  we  must  accept  a  “certain  level  of  risk  as  a  permanent  condition,”  how  can  we  tell  if  reducing  the  risk  is  an  effective  strategy?  Will  we  know  when  we’ve  reduced  risk  to  the  proper  level?  In  a  recent  paper,  Philip  Gordon,  a  senior  fellow  at  the  Brookings  Institution,  described  what  is  and  is  not  required  to  win  the  War  on  Terror.  He  argues  that  rather  than  concentrating  on  every  possible  threat,  the  government  should  concentrate  on  reducing  the  risk  of  terrorism.  He  even  suggests  the  acceptable  level  of  risk  that  policy  makers  should  strive  to  attain:  [Winning  the  War  on  Terror]  will  mean  not  the  complete  elimination  of  any  possible  terrorist  threat...but  rather  the  reduction  of  the  risk  of  terrorism  to  such  a  level  that  it  does  not  significantly  affect  average  citizens’  daily  lives,  preoccupy  their  thoughts,  or  provoke  overreaction.    At  that  point,  even  the  terrorists  will  realize  their  violence  is  futile.6  According  to  Gordon,  success  is  attained  when  the  risk  of  terrorism  has  been  reduced  to  such  a  level  that  it  does  not  “significantly  affect  average  citizens’  daily  lives,  preoccupy  their  thoughts,  or  provoke  overreaction.”  If  lack  of  overreaction  is  an  indicator,  we  must  be  having  some  success  at  reducing  the  risk.  After  all,  we  haven’t  had  a  run  on  duct  tape  since  2003!      Although  the  rhetorical  phrase  of  reducing  the  risk  has  only  recently  made  its  appearance,  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security’s  efforts  to  accomplish  this  goal  have  been  ongoing  for  the  past  six  years.  What  makes  the  rhetoric  so  important  is  the  ability  it  gives  policy  makers  to  answer  the  question:  Are  we  safer  today  than  we  were  six  years  ago?    The  answer  is  a  resounding  yes.  Over  the  past  six  years,  the  government  has  limited  terrorists’  capability  to  harm  us,  thereby  reducing  the  threat.  They  have  worked  to  reduce  our  vulnerability  by  hardening  targets  and  increasing  the  resiliency  of  our  critical  infrastructure.  They  have  worked  to  mitigate  consequence  by  acquiring  medical  countermeasures  against  biological,  chemical,  and  radiological  agents  of  terrorism.    All  of  these  successes  have  been  achieved  through  the  government’s  operations  to  deter,  detect,  and  disrupt  terrorist  activity  along  with  implementing  procedures  for  response  to  and  recovery  from  successful  terrorist  attacks.  Of  course,  people  have  made  an  industry  of  adding  terms  to  this  methodology,  but  all  of  these  tactics  play  their  role  in  reducing  single  or  multiple  factors  in  the  risk  equation.      
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The  risk  of  terrorism  will  occupy  the  minds  of  our  leaders  far  into  the  foreseeable  future.  Homeland  Security’s  enduring  mission  of  reducing  the  risk  should  guide  policy  makers  in  every  aspect  of  their  decisions  on  how  to  confront  this  challenge.  The  same  concept  should  be  used  to  measure  success  of  government  actions  and  policy  implementation.  Just  as  Keenan's  philosophy  of  containment  galvanized  the  Western  world  throughout  the  Cold  War,  the  concept  of  “reducing  the  risk”  will  help  Americans  understand  both  the  challenge  and  the  solution  for  as  long  as  terrorism  dominates  the  political  landscape.                                                                                                                            
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The  events  of  September  11,  2001  and  the  ensuing  anthrax  attacks  have  highlighted  the  need  for  public  health  preparedness  in  the  United  States.  The  public  health  infrastructure  of  the  United  States  has  eroded  during  the  last  twenty  years  due  to  a  “lack  of  funding,  focus,  and  national  attention.”  1  There  has  been  a  decrease  in  the  number  of  laboratories  and  public  health  personnel  which  has,  in  turn,  diminished  the  ability  of  professionals  to  collect  and  analyze  data,  conduct  disease  surveillance,  and  design  interventions  for  the  community.  2  The  public  health  system  had  been  “chronically  under-­‐funded  for  the  past  several  decades  and  the  ‘infrastructure  had  greatly  deteriorated.’”  3  The  anthrax  attacks  of  2001  served  as  a  wake-­‐up  call  for  public  health  and  medical  professionals,  the  American  public,  legislators  and  those  tasked  with  homeland  security;  the  nation’s  public  health  system  was  not  equipped  to  rapidly  and  effectively  respond  to  a  bioterrorism  attack  whether  small  or  large  in  scale.  4  To  help  the  nation  rebuild  the  public  health  infrastructure  to  respond  adequately  to  any  terrorist  attack,  Congress  has  passed  the  Public  Health  Threats  and  Emergencies  Act  of  2000  and  the  Public  Health  Security  and  Bioterrorism  Act  of  2002,  which  has  led  to  the  influx  of  approximately  ninety-­‐nine  million  dollars  into  the  rebuilding  the  public  health  infrastructure.  5  In  addition  to  the  increase  in  funding  directed  at  the  strengthening  of  the  public  health  infrastructure,  public  health  has  finally  been  included  as  a  member  of  the  homeland  security  “team.”  On  October  18,  2007,  President  George  W.  Bush  issued  Homeland  Security  Directive-­‐21  regarding  public  health  and  medical  preparedness.  The  directive  sets  forth  a  National  Strategy  for  protecting  the  health  of  Americans  during  a  disaster.  Homeland  security  funding  has  provided  for  the  reversal  of  the  last  twenty  years  
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of  public  health  infrastructure  erosion  resulting  in  the  emergence  of  a  stronger,  more  prepared  public  health  system.  Although  the  strengthening  of  the  public  health  infrastructure  has  been  the  most  successful  aspect  of  homeland  security,  its  ability  to  sustain  the  newly  strengthened  infrastructure  by  ensuring  that  newly  funded  programs  and  staffs  are  able  to  protect  the  nation’s  health  during  times  of  crisis  while  maintaining  healthy  communities  during  daily  life  is  public  health’s  greatest  challenge.    The  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)  was  formed  to  serve  as  the  unifying  force  to  lead  a  national  effort  to  protect  and  secure  America  and  its  people.  While  the  public  health  community  is  not  a  centralized  federal  department,  public  health  professionals  aim  to  protect  and  secure  the  American  people  from  poor  health,  illness,  and  disease.  The  strategic  goals  developed  by  DHS  (awareness,  prevention,  protection,  response,  recovery,  service,  and  organizational  excellence)  serve  as  important  benchmarks  by  which  to  measure  the  success  of  the  revitalization  of  the  American  public  health  infrastructure.    The  public  health  community  has  increased  its  awareness  of  disease  movement  and  illness  occurring  throughout  the  community  by  enhancing  its  surveillance  systems  and  hiring  epidemiologists  trained  in  recognizing  disease  trends  and  outbreaks.  One  such  example  of  a  surveillance  program,  introduced  by  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  in  conjunction  with  the  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA),  is  BioWatch.  BioWatch  is  a  program  which  utilizes  biological  pathogen  detectors  in  conjunction  with  EPA  air  quality  monitors  to  collect  particles  from  the  air  which  are  then  analyzed  by  public  health  laboratory  professionals.  6  In  the  event  of  a  pathogen  release,  the  goal  of  the  BioWatch  system  is  to  provide  early  warning  to  public  health  professionals  before  the  affected  population  begins  to  present  at  their  doctor’s  offices  and  local  emergency  rooms.  7  In  addition  to  BioWatch,  some  local  Departments  of  Health  have  been  able  to  implement  syndromic  surveillance  programs  due  to  the  increased  funding  provided  by  DHS.  Syndromic  surveillance  programs  allow  public  health  professionals  to  collect  and  analyze  data  on  health  trends  (i.e.  visits  to  the  emergency  department  and  flu  medication  sales).  Syndromic  surveillance  allows  for  the  categorization  of  patients’  chief  complaints  of  symptoms  into  coded  syndromes  (i.e.  vomit,  diarrhea,  and  rash).  Syndromic  surveillance  allows  public  health  professionals  to  have  access  to  “real-­‐time”  data  allowing  for  the  detection  of  a  sudden  increase  in  any  syndrome  without  waiting  for  final  diagnoses  or  lab  results.  While  syndromic  surveillance  can  serve  as  an  alerting  system  that  there  is  an  unusual  health  event  in  the  community,  it  is  also  prone  to  false  alarms  from  truly  sporadic  cases  of  illness;  therefore  it  is  imperative  that  trained  public  health  professionals  respond  to  the  “alarms.”  Homeland  security  funding  has  often  provided  the  funding  for  the  hiring  of  additional  Epidemiologists  for  local  health  departments.    Not  only  will  increased  surveillance  capacity  aid  public  health  professionals  in  detecting  any  suspicious  pathogen  releases,  it  can  also  be  used  routinely  to  detect  naturally  occurring  or  seasonal  outbreaks  in  communities.  The  influx  of  homeland  security  funding  which  was  in  part  used  to  bolster  surveillance  systems  has  helped  to  rebuild  the  public  health  infrastructure  needed  to  maintain  healthy  communities  throughout  the  country,  not  just  to  protect  them  in  the  event  of  a  bioterrorist  attack.  
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Each  year  in  the  United  States  approximately  36,000  people  die  from  the  seasonal  flu.  8  While  increased  surveillance  has  aided  public  health  professionals  in  monitoring  the  annual  flu  season,  homeland  security  funds  have  also  helped  public  health  professionals  
prepare  for  the  seasonal  flu  outbreaks.  In  the  event  of  any  large-­‐scale  bioterrorism  attack,  local  health  departments  may  need  to  provide  preventive  medication  and/or  vaccine  to  their  citizens  (mass  prophylaxis).  Homeland  security  funding  has  allowed  local  health  departments  to  plan  for  and  practice  their  mass  prophylaxis  plans.  Many  health  departments  have  used  their  seasonal  influenza  vaccination  program,  giving  free  flu  shots  to  members  of  their  community  immunizing  them  for  the  upcoming  flu  season,  to  test  their  mass  prophylaxis  plans.  One  local  public  health  department  (Bucks  County,  PA)  was  able  to  immunize  4,664  people  on  a  Saturday  at  four  locations  which  would  be  used  in  an  emergency  for  mass  prophylaxis.  Homeland  security  funding  allowed  the  health  department  to  order  additional  supplies  in  order  to  give  community  members  free  flu  shots,  along  with  providing  the  funding  for  staff  on  a  Saturday  –  a  more  convenient  time  for  many  working  adults  who  would  like  to  be  vaccinated.  While  local  health  departments  are  preparing  for  and  practicing  the  delivery  of  mass  prophylaxis,  which  may  be  necessary  in  the  event  of  a  bioterrorism  attack,  they  are  able  to  help  prevent  seasonal  influenza  in  their  communities.  Local  health  departments  will  be  able  to  sustain  a  state  of  readiness  by  holding  practice  drills  of  their  mass  prophylaxis  plan  each  year  in  addition  to  providing  a  needed  immunization  free  of  cost  to  their  local  community.  While  public  health  professionals  aim  to  protect  the  public  from  disease  and  illness,  homeland  security  initiatives  have  allowed  public  health  departments  to  begin  to  help  protect  the  nation’s  food  supply.  Public  health  professionals  have  long  been  involved  in  restaurant  inspections;  however  public  health  is  now  involved  in  planning  for  and  responding  to  agroterrorism,  the  deliberate  introduction  of  a  plant  or  animal  disease.  Homeland  security  initiatives  have  allowed  public  health  professionals  to  be  involved  in  food  safety  from  “farm  to  table.”  The  increased  involvement  of  public  health  has  allowed  for  an  increase  in  education  about  food-­‐borne  illness.  Food-­‐borne  illnesses  are  not  always  caused  by  improper  food  handling,  but  sometimes  are  a  result  of  actions  that  occur  on  the  farm.  Homeland  security  has  allowed  for  formation  of  professional  relationships  among  public  health,  agriculture,  and  distribution  professionals  along  with  retail  companies.  The  formation  of  these  relationships  and  the  resulting  understanding  of  the  “farm-­‐to-­‐table”  process  allow  public  health  professionals  to  know  who  to  call  during  outbreaks,  such  as  the  2007  spinach  outbreak  related  to  California  spinach  producers.  Homeland  security  initiatives  have  also  allowed  for  a  more  coordinated  response  to  not  only  bioterrorism  emergencies  but  to  any  naturally  occurring  outbreak.  Homeland  security  has  provided  for  the  formation  and  upgrading  of  many  communication  systems  (Health  Alert  Network)  which  have  assisted  public  health  professionals  in  recognizing  multi-­‐jurisdictional  outbreaks,  thus  breaking  down  the  jurisdictional  silos  that  often  limit  the  flow  of  information  between  colleagues.    In  addition  to  an  increase  in  communication  systems,  DHS  has  also  provided  for  the  opportunity  for  cross-­‐jurisdictional  training.  One  such  program,  Forensic  Epidemiology,  provides  for  public  health  professionals  and  law  enforcement  professionals  to  train  
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together  resulting  in  a  better  joint  understanding  of  job  functions  and  specimen  collection,  developing  joint  patient  interviewing,  and  establishing  chain  of  custody  of  samples.  In  the  event  of  a  bioterrorism  attack,  law  enforcement  and  public  health  will  need  to  work  together  to  identify  the  source  of  the  attack  and  the  pathogen.  While  the  importance  of  the  alliance  of  public  health  and  law  enforcement  is  easy  to  see  in  the  event  of  an  attack,  the  alliance  also  has  important  implications  for  routine  operations.  Law  enforcement  professionals  are  often  involved  in  transporting  criminals,  who  may  claim  to  have  (or  do  have)  infectious  diseases  such  as  tuberculosis  (TB).  The  formation  of  the  linkage  between  public  health  and  law  enforcement  has  given  each  discipline  a  resource.  Any  officer  who  has  questions  about  his  or  her  possible  exposure  to  TB  after  a  transport  will  know  who  to  call  to  obtain  exposure  information.    Not  only  have  homeland  security  initiatives  assisted  public  health  professionals  in  successfully  responding  to  events,  they  have  also  helped  public  health  professionals  to  assist  in  the  recovery  after  a  major  event  such  as  bioterrorism.  Homeland  security  has  made  public  health  professionals  part  of  the  first  responder  community  and  as  part  of  that  community  public  health  professionals  are  responsible  for  the  health  and  safety  of  other  first  responders.  Public  health  professionals  can  provide  vaccinations  and  prophylaxis  to  first  responders  and  their  families  so  that  they  are  able  to  continue  their  response  in  an  emergency.  The  anthrax  attacks  of  2001  demonstrated  the  importance  of  effective  public  education  and  media  relationships.  Homeland  security  initiatives  have  allowed  for  public  health  professionals  to  have  media  training.  It  became  clear  that  during  a  health  emergency,  such  as  the  anthrax  attacks  of  2001,  the  public  wanted  to  hear  information  from  medical  personnel,  not  public  information  spokespersons.  Public  health  professionals  have  received  media  training  and  will  be  able  to  assist  in  the  recovery  efforts  by  providing  accurate  and  appropriate  health  information  and  instructions.    The  Department  of  Homeland  Security  is  a  unifying  department  in  the  federal  government,  which  exists  to  serve  the  people  of  the  United  States.  While  serving  the  American  population,  homeland  security  initiatives  have  also  provided  opportunities  for  the  American  population  to  serve  each  other  and  volunteer.  The  Medical  Reserve  Corps  (MRC)  was  founded  in  2002  and  is  a  federal  program  aimed  at  strengthening  the  resources  of  local  communities.  The  MRC  provides  an  opportunity  for  interested  community  members  to  volunteer  to  help  their  community  prepare  for  and  respond  to  local  emergencies,  along  with  promoting  healthy  living.  9  In  a  true  health  emergency,  public  health  and  emergency  workers  will  not  be  able  to  provide  the  staffing  resources  needed  to  operate  enough  centers  to  accomplish  mass  prophylaxis  in  a  community;  MRC  volunteers  are  a  surge  support  that  local  public  health  agencies  can  call  upon  in  an  emergency.    Not  only  will  MRC  volunteers  be  an  invaluable  resource  during  an  emergency,  they  can  also  increase  community  connectedness  with  local  public  health  departments.  When  public  health  professionals  do  their  jobs  well,  it  often  is  not  public  knowledge.  When  an  outbreak  is  prevented,  there  are  no  news  stories  or  press  releases,  so  much  of  the  public  is  unaware  of  the  great  resource  a  local  public  health  department  can  be.  MRC  volunteers  provide  
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public  health  professionals  an  important  link  to  the  community  they  serve.  By  becoming  a  more  visible  and  trusted  part  of  the  local  community,  public  health  messages  delivered  may  be  heeded  in  times  of  calm  as  well  as  during  an  emergency.  The  rebuilding  of  the  public  health  infrastructure  was  also  greatly  influenced  by  the  final  strategic  goal  of  homeland  security:  organizational  excellence.  The  public  health  system  in  the  United  States  is  a  segmented  system  consisting  of  independent  local  health  departments,  state  health  departments,  and,  at  the  federal  level,  the  Centers  for  Disease  Control  and  Prevention  (CDC).  The  introduction  of  the  National  Incident  Management  System  (NIMS)  has  provided  all  public  health  agencies  with  a  standardized  management  system  with  which  to  respond  to  emergencies  large  and  small.  NIMS  incorporates  best  practices  from  other  management  models  and  provides  a  consistency  throughout  all  agencies.  NIMS  has  not  only  enabled  different  public  health  agencies  to  speak  the  same  language  but  has  also  enabled  public  health  agencies  to  communicate  effectively  with  other  first  responder  agencies.  The  introduction  of  NIMS  has  eliminated  the  use  of  professional  jargon  in  emergency  response  and  has  created  a  system  where  responders  can  plug  into  a  response  regardless  of  whether  or  not  it  is  being  led  by  their  jurisdiction.    With  the  increase  in  opportunities  for  multi-­‐jurisdictional  and  multi-­‐disciplinary  training,  the  introduction  of  NIMS  has  allowed  for  a  seamless  response  to  emergencies.  The  introduction  of  ICS  (the  Incident  Command  System,  a  sub-­‐section  of  NIMS)  has  eliminated  the  need  for  specific  profession-­‐related  job  titles  and  has  allowed  first  responders  from  different  agencies  and  from  across  the  country  to  effortlessly  “plug-­‐in”  to  an  active  response.  NIMS  has  created  a  standard  operating  procedure  for  the  many  different  first  responder  agencies  that  provides  a  form  of  unity  across  all  jurisdictions.    The  public  health  infrastructure  in  the  United  States  had  been  slowly  eroding  throughout  the  past  few  decades.  Homeland  security  funding  has  begun  the  re-­‐building  of  the  nation’s  public  health  system.  Each  of  the  seven  strategic  goals  of  DHS  (awareness,  prevention,  protection,  response,  recovery,  service,  and  organizational  excellence)  has  directly  impacted  the  re-­‐building  of  the  public  health  infrastructure.  The  most  critical  aspect  of  the  success  of  homeland  security  initiatives  is  the  ability  to  use  the  improvements  made  possible  by  DHS  in  routine  incidents  as  well  as  those  which  are  emergencies.  Creating  a  strong  viable  public  health  infrastructure  will  always  ensure  that  there  will  be  qualified  professionals  conducting  surveillance  for  pathogens,  practicing  mass  prophylaxis,  safe-­‐guarding  the  food  supply,  participating  in  cross-­‐jurisdictional  training  and  communication  efforts,  participating  in  media  training,  keeping  first  responders  healthy,  creating  volunteer  opportunities  and  community  outreach,  along  with  continuing  the  development  of  a  consistent  approach  to  incident  management.  Each  one  of  those  activities  will  help  to  protect  the  community  from  homeland  security  threats  and  will  also  protect  the  community  from  everyday  hazards  such  as  the  presence  of  E.coli  in  spinach  and  seasonal  influenza  outbreaks.  The  improvements  in  the  public  health  infrastructure  will  help  during  everyday  occurrences  but  can  also  be  scaled-­‐up  to  handle  large  scale  bioterrorism  attacks.  Homeland  security  must  become  a  part  of  our  everyday  lives,  not  something  which  we  concentrate  on  only  when  the  security  threats  are  raised.  To  be  a  part  of  our  daily  lives,  homeland  security  programs  must  be  sustainable  and  applicable  to  everyday  life.  The  
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continued  strengthening  of  the  public  health  infrastructure  allows  for  the  use  of  homeland  security  improvements  and  initiatives  while  also  preparing  to  identify  and  respond  to  any  threat  to  our  security.                                                                                                                            
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There  are  a  multitude  of  definitions  for  the  term  homeland  security.  What  precisely  constitutes  a  nation  secure?  And  what  balance  must  be  employed  to  ensure  that  such  safety  does  not  lie  in  the  marginalization  of  the  freedoms  all  citizens  desire?  The  pursuit  of  academic  insight  and  understanding  will  guide  our  nation’s  pathway  to  security.  The  questions  that  such  analytical  pursuits  generate  will  give  rise  to  answers  within  uncertainty.  Uncertainty  will  remain  a  constant  in  the  terrorist  equation,  an  element  of  every  question  regarding  terrorism.  It  is  a  surety  that  such  questions  need  to  be  continuously  addressed.  The  concept  of  homeland  security,  or  the  ideal  of  a  safe  and  secure  nation,  is  not  new.  It  is  not  a  recently  contrived  or  generated  thought  or  purpose,  catalyzed  by  the  events  of  September  11,  2001.  The  tenets  of  a  safe  and  secure  nation  existed  even  before  our  nation  states  coalesced  into  a  united  political  and  governmental  structure.  It  is  the  continuance  of  an  existing  ideal,  more  sharply  illuminated  by  the  September  11th  tragedy,  which  has  narrowly  focused  our  perception  upon  this  purpose.  The  September  11th  terrorist  attack  has  immeasurably  and  forever  altered  America’s  perception  of  what  constitutes  a  secure  nation.  There  can  be  no  singularly  applied  investment  or  strategy  which  will  yield  a  safe  and  secure  homeland.  But  the  premise  underlying  the  connective  applications  of  this  objective  contains  a  thread  of  commonality.  What  reveals  this  similarity?  What  derivative  underlies  the  vast  investments  made  into  answering  the  question:  in  what  direction  must  our  nation  focus  its  security  efforts?  The  single  most  important  aspect  of  homeland  security  has  been,  and  will  be,  the  dedicated  investment  in  academic  research  and  inquiry  led  by  our  nation’s  institutes  of  higher  education  and  learning.  Insight  and  direction  are  gained  with  knowledge  and  understanding.  But  within  the  clarity  of  insight  lies  a  complexity  which  reveals  both  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  threat  and  the  vulnerable  nature  of  our  nation’s  infrastructure.    
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A  DYNAMIC  THREAT  Terrorism,  by  its  very  nature,  employs  a  hidden  and  shrouded  operational  method.  Uncertainty  as  to  where,  when,  or  how  terrorists  may  strike  deepens  our  fear  of  the  terrorist  agenda.  Additionally  it  scatters  the  finite  resources  available  to  protect  and  secure  our  nation’s  infrastructure.  Threats  against  the  nation  that  were  once  orderly  in  nature  now  display  the  highest  states  of  disorder,  the  resulting  entropy  leads  to  uncertainty  as  to  how  such  threats  can  be  surmounted.  The  allocation  of  limited  resources  cannot  protect  every  structure,  harden  every  target,  secure  every  length  of  border,  or  encase  the  nation  in  a  totally  secure  or  impenetrable  position.  Therefore  what  discrete  steps  may  be  taken  to  achieve  the  daunting  task  of  securing  a  nation  which  bases  its  existence  on  openness  and  freedom?  The  best  and  most  informed  manner  in  which  that  question  can  be  answered  is  through  academic  research  and  inquiry.  Finite  resources  demand  the  selective  and  intensive  scrutiny  of  critical  insight  and  analysis.  There  is  no  aspect  of  human  endeavor  where  academic  inquiry  has  not  led  to  a  higher  understanding  of  a  problem  and  therefore  a  basis  on  which  to  proceed  toward  a  solution  in  an  educated  and  informed  manner.  Research  into  the  operational  methods  and  philosophical  underpinnings  of  particular  terrorist  entities,  foreign  or  domestic,  will  provide  a  pathway  for  securing  our  nation  based  upon  clearly  defined  analytical  interpretations.  The  knowledge  gained  through  such  academic  pursuits  will  allow  limited  resources  to  be  directed  to  significant  areas  of  concern  or  risk.  Areas  that  are  deemed  essential  and  assigned  risk  profiles  –  qualifying  such  areas  as  having  a  dynamic  and  cascading  domino  effect  on  the  volatility  of  succeeding  infrastructures  –  must  be  identified.  A  clear  and  precise  accounting  of  our  nation’s  infrastructure  and  the  closely  paralleled  and  linked  systems  upon  which  such  infrastructure  depends,  must  be  undertaken  to  illuminate  which  areas  deserve  the  highest  consideration.    The  terrorist  operational  methodology,  employing  an  asymmetrical  approach,  particularly  enforces  the  necessity  to  examine  the  executed  terrorist  operations  –  both  discretely  and  within  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  inherent  in  such  attacks.  Every  terrorist  attack  perpetuated  by  a  particular  and  distinct  organization  has  a  certain  linkage  to  other  attacks  –  even  if  such  linkage  is  formed  only  by  a  thin  and  slightly  similar  philosophical  or  operational  agenda.  Terrorism  is  a  defined  means  to  achieve  a  sociological  or  political  objective  in  which  fear  and  intimidation  play  a  central  role.  The  purpose  and  intent  of  such  an  incident  sheds  light  on  the  effects  the  terrorist  entity  desires  to  achieve  and  provides  insight  into  how  a  particular  organization  wishes  to  carry  out  its  intended  goal.    How  can  academic  inquiry  lead  to  a  safe  and  secure  Homeland?  Through  quantitative  study  and  analysis  the  terrorist  structure  and  operational  functionality  can  be  “reverse  engineered”  (borrowing  a  term  associated  with  the  applied  science  of  engineering).  The  terrorist  actions,  through  careful  examination,  inspection,  and  study,  will  yield  the  information  through  which  the  structural  and  operational  functionality  of  the  terrorist  organization  is  exposed  and  will  further  reveal  the  mechanism  for  response.  
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It  is  difficult  (if  not  impossible)  to  assign  any  degree  of  certainty  to  such  events  which,  by  their  very  nature,  incorporate  such  a  dynamic  and  non-­‐linear  basis  of  function.  Once  rigid  and  stabilized  threats  against  the  United  States,  that  were  clearly  defined  and  readily  discernable,  now  have  fractured  into  an  unstable  and  chaotic  threat  potential.  The  terrorist  operational  method  purposefully  employs  such  characteristics  and  uncertainty  has  become  a  most  effective  weapon  of  choice.  STRUCTURES  OF  UNCERTAINTY  The  structure  of  a  complex  organization  often  provides  a  very  real  insight  into  how  the  organization  plans  to  accomplish  its  goal.  The  mechanics  of  structure  portray  the  operational  functionality  of  the  organization.  But  the  fractured  cellular  nature  of  terrorist  organizations  and  their  lack  of  a  clearly  defined  structural  apparatus  produces  uncertainty  of  how  the  terrorists  plan  to  achieve  their  objective.  This  uncertainty  is  woven  as  a  fiber  into  the  methods  employed  by  the  terrorists  and  results  in  a  lack  of  a  clear  perception  as  to  where,  when,  or  how  the  threat  will  be  manifested.  This  disordered  structure  assists  the  terrorist  entity  by  prohibiting  a  definitive  course  of  preventative  action.  This  is  particularly  applicable  when  limited  resources  prevent  the  securing  of  every  point  of  vulnerability.  At  any  given  moment,  the  threat  to  our  national  security  remains  intact.    How  is  it  possible  for  academic  research  and  study  to  provide  a  solution  to  the  complex  nature  of  this  type  of  threat?  Despite  the  fact  that  the  United  States  has  the  most  technologically  advanced  military  in  the  world,  employing  the  most  highly  trained  and  well  equipped  soldiers  in  the  world,  our  nation  remains  at  risk.  Some  have  argued  that  it  is  only  a  matter  of  time  before  the  United  States  once  again  suffers  an  attack  similar  in  size  and  pernicious  intensity  to  the  September  11th  terrorist  attack.  The  utilization  of  a  chemical,  biological,  or  nuclear  component  in  such  an  attack  remains  a  possiblity  and  certainly  remains  a  favorable  and  potentially  desired  method  for  the  terrorist  community.  Uncertainty  is  the  hallmark  of  complexity.  But  the  complexity  of  the  terrorist  ideal  demands  the  rational  insight  gained  from  academic  investigation.  Solutions  may  be  derived  as  to  how  to  effectively  secure  the  nation  by  assessing  the  vulnerability  of  the  nation’s  infrastructure.  Research  must  span  the  entire  spectrum  of  terrorist  operations.  Funding  of  academic  research  must  be  a  priority  and  must  be  strengthened.  The  course  of  action  yielded  from  this  approach  will  illuminate  where  finite  resources  can  be  applied  to  diminish  the  terrorist  objective.  THE  ACADEMIC  INVESTMENT  What  course  of  human  conduct  has  not  been  touched  by  academic  insight?  Our  nation’s  academic  and  research  institutions  have  established  a  superior  and  unsurpassed  perspective  into  almost  every  area  of  human  endeavor.  The  capacity  to  formulate  solutions  to  highly  dynamic  and  complex  problems  requires  a  sustained  academic  expenditure.  Practical  and  common  sense  solutions  are  derived  from  the  results  of  such  academic  inquiry.  Research  requires  a  constant  and  prolonged  financial  infusion.  The  federal  
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government  of  the  United  States,  charged  with  the  task  of  protecting  every  citizen,  must  directly  invest  significant  financial  resources  into  our  nation’s  academic  institutions.  The  threat  to  our  nation’s  security  is  no  longer  symmetrical  in  appearance,  form,  or  function.  But  the  lack  of  a  uniform  threat  mandates  the  necessity  of  a  clear  academic  understanding.  The  application  of  technologically  advanced  solutions  must  be  tempered  with  knowledge.  There  can  be  no  replacement  for  a  clear  and  rational  understanding  of  the  complex  blueprint  of  national  security.  Uncertainty  will  remain  a  definitive  element  of  the  process  of  understanding,  but  uncertainty  can  be  diminished  by  perspective.  But  uncertainty  may  lead  to  an  undesired  and  counterproductive  end  result,  based  on  what  the  terrorist  desired  to  achieve.  The  consequence  of  uncertainty  has  affirmed  the  necessity  of  vigilance.  The  recognition  that  vulnerability  lies  at  the  hub  of  the  terrorist  wheel  has  led  institutions  to  question  and  refine  the  definition  of  what  constitutes  a  secure  homeland.  What  was  once  a  nation  that  never  envisioned  the  totality  of  terror  wrought  from  the  September  11,  2001  terrorist  attack  on  New  York  City,  now  realizes  that  the  security  of  our  nation  forever  lies  within  the  nature  of  our  preparation.  Preparedness  must  employ  a  decisive  recognition  that  through  academic  research  and  inquiry  the  path  to  a  secure  homeland  will  be  resolved.  Uncertainty  will  always  remain  a  definitive  element  of  this  task.  Through  knowledge  and  understanding,  the  precise  nature  of  what  lies  ahead  may  be  determined.  The  smallest  and  most  imperceptible  detail  forms  a  part  of  the  fabric  of  solution.  Academic  institutions  have  no  rival  in  their  ability  to  address  highly  complex  and  analytical  problems.  That  ability  will  lead  to  answers  as  to  how  our  nation  will  achieve  security.  There  are  a  multitude  of  definitions  for  the  term  “homeland  security.”  There  are  a  multitude  of  questions  as  to  how  to  precisely  achieve  this  most  highly  prized  and  desired  objective,  of  which  academic  research  and  inquiry  is  our  nation’s  most  secure  investment.                 
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ROLLED  UP  At  about  9:00  p.m.  on  May  7,  2007,  Dritan  and  Shain  Duka  arrived  at  a  home  in  Cherry  Hill,  New  Jersey.  1  They  had  an  important  meeting  that  night—a  meeting  long  in  the  making.    They  rang  the  doorbell  and  waited.  Their  appointment  was  to  purchase  AK-­‐47  and  M-­‐16  assault  rifles,  the  first  installment  of  weapons  needed  for  a  terrorist  attack  against  targets  in  the  U.S.  The  Dukas  must  have  been  nervous;  Osama  bin  Laden  himself  had  not  successfully  attacked  the  United  States  at  home  since  September  11th.  The  Dukas  probably  did  not  attribute  al  Qa‘ida  and  bin  Laden’s  failure  to  an  innovation  in  U.S.  government  counter  terrorism  organization.  Perhaps  they  should  have.  Members  of  the  South  Jersey  Joint  Terrorism  Task  Force  (JTTF)  closed  in,  arresting  the  Dukas  and  four  other  alleged  co-­‐conspirators.  Work  by  the  JTTF,  involving  law  enforcement  personnel  from  a  sweeping  range  of  local,  state,  and  federal  agencies,  had  turned  a  single  tip  into  six  arrests.        That  tip,  from  Circuit  City  clerk  Brian  Morgenstern,  began  an  eighteen-­‐month  long  investigation  by  the  South  Jersey  JTTF.  2  Over  a  year  and  a  half,  the  JTTF  tracked  the  suspects  and  their  activities  by  drawing  on  the  expertise,  contacts,  and  unique  knowledge  of  individual  JTTF  members  from  law  enforcement  agencies  at  every  jurisdictional  level.  The  team  collaborated  to  build  an  investigation  on  thorough  and  convincing  evidence  of  the  suspects’  conspiracy  to  attack  the  U.S.  Army  base  at  Fort  Dix,  New  Jersey,  as  well  as  possibly  other  military  bases  and  public    
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events.  On  May  7,  2007,  the  “Fort  Dix  Six”  were  arrested  and  accused  of  conspiring  to  commit  murder.  Since  that  time,  one  of  the  conspirators  has  pled  guilty  to  weapons  charges.  The  other  suspects  await  trial.  HOMELAND  SECURITY  AND  INNOVATING  BUREAUCRATIC  ORGANIZATION  The  Joint  Terrorism  Task  Force  is  a  homeland  security  success  because  of  the  “mission-­‐first”  attitude  inherent  to  its  organization.  The  JTTFs,  as  “cross-­‐functional  teams,”  are  composed  of  officers  from  nearly  every  major  law  enforcement  entity  in  the  United  States.  This  organization  makes  the  mission  paramount  by  subordinating  traditional  institutional  and  bureaucratic  boundaries  to  the  critical  counterterrorism  tasks  at  hand.  The  fact  that  terrorists  have  not  successfully  conducted  a  domestic  terrorist  attack  against  the  United  States  is  not  an  accident  and  is  not  for  lack  of  effort  on  the  terrorists’  part.  Dr.  James  Carafano  of  the  Heritage  Foundation  notes  at  least  sixteen  major  terror  plots  disrupted  by  U.S.  law  enforcement  since  the  World  Trade  Center  attack.  3  The  case  of  the  Dukas’  conspiracy  is  just  one  thread  in  a  tapestry  of  counterterrorism  and  homeland  security  successes  by  the  JTTFs  since  9/11.      Consequence  management,  the  ability  of  the  U.S.  government  to  respond  to  and  recover  from  a  devastating  terrorist  attack  or  natural  disaster,  will  be  the  most  critical  element  of  homeland  security  success  in  the  future.  Even  if  we  are  able  to  prevent  every  future  terrorist  attack,  the  U.S.  government  must  still  be  capable  of  responding  to  catastrophic  natural  disasters  to  save  lives  and  diminish  damage  to  property.  As  President  Bush  and  others  have  said,  while  the  U.S.  government  must  be  right  every  time,  the  terrorists  need  only  be  lucky  once.    Hurricane  Katrina  painfully  demonstrated  that  when  local,  state,  and  federal  agencies  respond  to  catastrophes,  the  whole  is  far  less  than  the  sum  of  its  parts.  Though  some  progress  is  being  made,  observations  from  the  most  recent  National  Level  Exercises  and  observations  recorded  in  the  2006  Katrina  Lessons  Learned  Report  still  reflect  that  mission  success  in  consequence  management  takes  a  backseat  to  parochialism  among  departments  and  agencies.  4  This  essay  identifies  what  makes  the  JTTF  successful  and  applies  those  lessons  to  the  planning  and  execution  of  consequence  management  operations.    The  first  section  of  the  essay  addresses  the  Department  of  Justice  charter  for  preventing  terrorist  attacks  and  the  history  of  the  JTTF  as  the  context  for  its  organizational  arrangement  and  success.  The  second  section  proposes  applying  a  structure  similar  to  that  of  the  JTTF  to  U.S.  government  consequence  management  planning  and  execution.      EXPLORING  THE  SUCCESS  OF  THE  JOINT  TERRORISM  TASK  FORCE  The  JTTF  is  structured  to  meet  mission  requirements  rather  than  managerial  vision  per  se.  Former  President  Clinton’s  Presidential  Decision  Directive  –  39  validated  and  reaffirmed  a  long-­‐accepted  view  that  law  enforcement,  in  particular  the  FBI,  leads  the  domestic  counterterrorism  mission.  5  Those  responsible  for  accomplishing  this  mission,  FBI  special    
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agents  in  the  field,  recognized  that  they  could  never  succeed  without  the  help  and  contributions  of  all  other  stakeholders.  The  normal  organization  of  the  FBI  was  insufficient  to  cover  the  totality  of  their  responsibilities.  The  FBI  accepted  the  interagency  task  force  as  the  best  mechanism  for  integrating  all  local,  state,  and  federal  stakeholders  into  the  counterterrorism  mission.  The  FBI  first  explored  flexible  interagency  task  forces  in  1979  with  criminal  bank  robbery  investigations  in  New  York  City.  6  This  criminal  task  force  featured  a  single  location  with  personnel  from  the  FBI,  New  York  State,  and  New  York  City  law  enforcement  agencies  and  was  a  major  success.  In  May  1980,  FBI  special  agents  decided  the  interagency  task  force  organizational  arrangement  was  the  mechanism  they  needed  to  accomplish  the  counterterrorism  mission.  The  New  York  City  Task  Force  responded  to  terrorist  threats  by  Puerto  Rican  separatists,  the  Weathermen  Underground,  and  violent  elements  of  the  Black  Panther  Party  that  were  joining  together.  “Out  of  necessity,”  notes  Supervisory  Special  Agent  Brad  Swim  of  the  National  Joint  Terrorism  Task  Force,  “New  York  ventured  into  the  Task  Force  concept  for  the  JTTF.”  Since  that  time,  the  JTTF  has  become  the  federal  model  for  the  counterterrorism  mission.  As  of  October  2007,  102  JTTFs  operated  full-­‐time,  with  just  over  half  their  personnel  from  the  FBI,  25  percent  from  state  and  local  law  enforcement,  and  21  percent  from  other  federal  law  enforcement  agencies.  7  Individual  JTTFs  have  no  set  staffing  pattern;  staffing,  like  counterterrorism  investigation,  is  a  franchise  responsibility.  State  and  local  law  enforcement  agencies  offer  their  personnel  for  detail  to  the  local  JTTF  because  of  the  valuable  networking  and  investigative  experience  they  gain.  The  broad  acceptance  of  the  concept  and  its  record  of  terrorism  prevention  strongly  suggest  that  the  JTTF  works.  The  core  principles  of  synergy  and  task  orientation  make  the  JTTF  successful.    Ideally,  JTTF  members  assigned  by  their  parent  agency  are  full  partners  in  every  aspect  of  JTTF  operations  without  regard  to  which  federal,  state,  or  local  law  enforcement  agency  employs  them.  8  The  individuals  working  at  the  JTTF  who  are  not  FBI  personnel  provide  valuable  reach  back  and  collaboration  with  their  parent  agencies,  but  their  daily  assignments  and  investigative  duties  support  only  JTTF  operations.  This  arrangement  avoids  supervisory  conflicts.  The  regular  cycling  of  employees  from  other  law  enforcement  agencies  to  the  JTTF  facilitates  a  level  of  information  sharing  and  collaboration  that  would  be  impossible  in  separate  organizations  that  meet  and  share  information  only  occasionally.  The  JTTF,  representing  the  work  of  all  area  law  enforcement  in  countering  terrorism,  exemplifies  government  operations  that  add  up  to  more  than  the  sum  of  their  parts.  APPLYING  THE  SUCCESS  OF  THE  JTTF  TO  CONSEQUENCE  MANAGEMENT  OPERATIONS  Public  and  private  sector  studies  on  “matrix  organizations”  and  “cross-­‐functional  teams”  describe  why  the  principles  of  the  JTTF  work  well.  According  to  a  Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO)  report,  “collaboration  can  be  broadly  defined  as  any  joint  activity  that  is  intended  to  produce  more  public  value  than  could  be  produced  when  organizations  act  alone.”  9  The  GAO  contends  this  extra  value  is  generated  through  a  defined  and  articulated  common  outcome;  mutually  reinforcing  or  joint  strategies;  
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leveraging  common  resources;  agreed  upon  roles  and  responsibilities;  and  compatible  policies  and  procedures  among  other  elements.  All  these  points  are  exemplified  by  the  JTTF  organization.  Private  sector  organizational  theorists  Donald  Cushman  and  Sarah  King  call  this  “cross-­‐functional  teamwork,”  10  which  enhances  organizational  efficiency  by  “effective  removal  of  all  the  artificial  barriers  between  functional  units  along  the  value  chain  of  the  firm.”  Cross-­‐functional  teamwork  also  facilitates  “cooperation  between  people  from  different  traditional  organizational  units,”  eliminating  problems  which  plague  a  company  or  its  customers  as  a  result  of  a  cross-­‐functional  dispute  where  no  one  entity  controls  the  process.  Finally,  “cross-­‐functional  teams  facilitate  intraproject  and  interproject  cooperation.”  These  qualities,  found  in  the  JTTF,  are  absent  from  U.S.  government  consequence  management  operations  where  institutional  boundaries  are  paramount  over  mission  success.  Cushman  and  King  identify  a  major  reason  why  consequence  management  operations  fail.  They  aptly,  albeit  pessimistically,  state  that  “people  who  work  in  different  functions  [organizations]  hate  each  other.”  11  The  JTTF,  as  a  cross-­‐functional  team,  makes  the  traditional  jurisdictional  disputes  of  law  enforcement  irrelevant  by  reorienting  everyone  towards  the  same  goal  on  the  same  team.  The  National  Response  Framework  (NRF),  the  updated  guidelines  for  U.S.  government  consequence  management,  often  confuses  the  reader  with  multiple  goals  under  several  command  structures  in  numerous  offices  across  different  locations.  Rather  than  upsetting  the  traditional  authorities  and  their  corresponding  budgets,  the  NRF  at  times  seems  to  reinforce  the  primacy  of  institutional  boundaries  at  the  expense  of  the  mission.  The  overlapping  responsibilities  of  the  National  Interagency  Fire  Center  (NIFC)  and  the  National  Response  Coordination  Center  (NRCC)  serve  as  an  example.  While  the  NRCC  is  the  coordination  center  for  all  disasters  in  the  United  States,  the  NIFC  acts  as  another  coordination  center  for  only  fire  emergencies.  While  both  these  staffs  work  hard  to  support  senior  leader  decision  makers,  having  two  operations  centers,  where  one  could  suffice,  creates  a  needless  opportunity  for  confusion.  Firefighters  and  decision  makers  may  be  left  perplexed  about  whose  information  is  correct  and  who  is  really  in  charge.  Observers  should  not  be  surprised  that  the  JTTF  has  enjoyed  success;  after  all,  it  has  gone  farther  than  most  elements  of  the  U.S.  government  to  institute  the  cross-­‐functional  team  model.  In  Managing  the  Public  Organization,  Cole  Graham  and  Steven  Hays  articulate  the  vision  of  cross-­‐functional  teams  (also  called  matrix  organizations):    In  matrix  organizations,  the  various  specialists  are  joined  in  a  common  purpose,  thanks  to  their  membership  on  a  team  that  is  supervised  and  coordinated  by  an  individual  with  responsibility  for  achieving  a  defined  set  of  project  goals.    Meanwhile,  however,  their  ties  to  their  functional  departments  are  not  entirely  severed…in  addition  to  enabling  managers  to  coordinate  specialists  more  effectively,  matrix  organizations  have  achieved  a  reputation  for  creating  work  environments  that  are  highly  motivating  and  productive  of  innovations.  12  In  his  book,  Richard  Daft  outlines  three  conditions  that  precipitate  the  need  for  matrix  organizations.  13  The  cross-­‐functional  team  is  the  most  desirable  approach  when  two  or  
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more  critical  sectors  compete  for  lead  responsibility  in  a  task  area;  when  the  task  environment  is  complex  and  uncertain;  and  when  an  economy  of  scale  is  required  to  conserve  resources.  No  U.S.  government  mission  reflects  these  three  conditions  more  than  consequence  management  operations.  Our  Federalist  principles  will  not  allow  a  single  U.S.  government  entity  to  own  all  aspects  of  consequence  management.  14  Cross-­‐functional  teams  must  solve  the  problems  posed  by  consequence  management.  The  federal  government  should  adopt  a  sensible  process  for  consequence  management  planning  and  execution  at  the  headquarters  level,  15  and  nominate  a  single  cross-­‐functional  team  under  an  individual  department  or  agency  for  each  step  of  that  process.    This  assembly  line  would  consist  of  cross-­‐functional  teams  with  members  from  all  federal  departments  and  agencies  and  some  state,  local,  non-­‐profit,  and  private  sector  entities  that  are  owned  and  housed  by  a  lead  department  or  agency.  An  example  process  is  outlined  below:  16    
x Threat  Analysis  –  completed  by  a  cross-­‐functional  team  under  the  director  of  National  Intelligence,  identifies  which  missions  demand  imminent  preparation;  
x Strategic  Guidance  Statement  –  completed  by  a  cross-­‐functional  team  owned  by  the  White  House  Homeland  Security  Council,  establishes  the  goals  for  planning;      
x Deliberate  Planning  Process  –  completed  by  the  Incident  Management  Planning  Team  (IMPT),  a  cross-­‐functional  team  already  in  existence  and  owned  by  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS),  produces  the  following:    
o analysis  of  the  mission  based  on  the  strategic  guidance,  with  IMPT  team  
members  obtaining  feedback  from  their  parent  organizations;  
o a  concept  of  operations  to  be  approved  by  each  parent  organization;  and  
o a  full  deliberate  plan  for  review  and  approval  by  the  senior  leaders  in  each  
representative  organization;  
x Crisis  Action  Plan  –  completed  by  a  cross-­‐functional  team  in  the  DHS  National  Operations  Center  (NOC)  no  more  than  twenty-­‐four  hours  after  a  contingency  occurs,  fills  in  the  holes  of  the  IMPT’s  deliberate  plan  with  the  event’s  details;  and    
x Mission  Assignments  –  completed  by  a  cross-­‐functional  team  in  the  Federal  Emergency  Management  Agency  NRCC,  gives  specific  orders  for  every  actor  in  the  crisis  to  conduct  their  missions  according  to  the  plan  produced  by  the  NOC.  This  process,  based  on  cross-­‐functional  teaming,  guarantees  a  collaboratively-­‐developed,  collaboratively-­‐executed  consequence  management  operation  at  the  federal  department  and  agency  level.  While  fully  reorganizing  the  federal  government  consequence  management  planning  and  execution  system  into  cross-­‐functional  teams  is  revolutionary,  there  are  some  indications  that  such  a  change  may  be  underway.  DHS,  created  in  the  aftermath  of  9/11,  aspired  to  the  effects  of  a  cross-­‐functional  team  but  failed  to  institute  the  concept  as  designed.  The  IMPT  theoretically  is  a  cross-­‐functional  team,  but  so  far  has  only  a  low  level  of  representation  from  organizations  outside  DHS.  The  IMPT  is  a  cross-­‐functional  team  for  deliberate  planning,  but  federal  department  and  agency  headquarters  also  need  cross-­‐functional  teams  to  identify  threats,  provide  strategic  guidance,  and  then  turn  deliberate  plans  into  
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crisis  action  plans  and  mission  assignments.  Our  current  piecemeal  initiatives  are  well-­‐meaning  but  miss  the  mark.  Real  success  in  consequence  management  operations  will  require  a  revolution  of  the  bureaucracy,  with  cross-­‐functional  teams  as  the  organizing  principle.    CONCLUSION  Our  nation’s  federalism  guarantees  that  we  will  continue  to  have  essential  responsibilities  dispersed  across  many  organizations  at  the  federal,  state,  and  local  levels  of  government  as  well  as  non-­‐profit  and  private  sector  organizations.  To  avoid  the  inevitable  confusion  created  by  diffuse  responsibilities  across  multiple  layers  of  government  in  a  crisis  situation,  we  need  to  adopt  cross-­‐functional  teaming  on  a  grand  scale.  The  JTTF  has  demonstrated  the  manifold  benefits  of  cross-­‐functional  teams  by  demonstrating  success  in  counterterrorism.  The  American  people  deserve  the  demonstrated  success  of  cross-­‐functional  teaming  for  consequence  management,  the  most  critical  future  aspect  of  homeland  security.                                                                                                                            
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INTRODUCTION  The  anthrax  mailings  that  followed  the  terrorist  airline  attacks  on  the  United  States  in  September  2001  brought  the  threat  of  biological  terrorism  abruptly  back  into  the  national  security  spotlight,  as  well  as  into  the  collective  consciousness  of  the  American  public.  Those  incidents  demonstrated  a  key  vulnerability  in  homeland  defenses,  and  the  United  States  government  reacted  accordingly.  Between  2004  and  2007,  the  president  issued  three  Homeland  Security  Presidential  Directives  (HSPDs)  that  specifically  address  the  threat  of  biological  weapons.  Additionally,  we  have  seen  a  profound  increase  in  the  number  of  high-­‐level  microbiology  and  biomedical  research  laboratories  in  the  past  few  years.  Currently,  no  single  federal  agency  has  a  mission  to  track  and  regulate  this  ever-­‐expanding  network  of  laboratories.  This  represents  a  key  gap  in  our  efforts  to  ensure  the  provision  of  national  security.  The  purpose  of  this  essay  is  to  summarize  the  provisions  relating  to  biodefense  contained  within  the  HSPDs,  to  trace  the  proliferation  of  high-­‐level  biomedical  research  laboratories  in  the  twenty-­‐first  century,  and  to  recommend  actions  for  safeguarding  those  laboratories  and  the  citizens  they  serve.  HOMELAND  SECURITY  PRESIDENTIAL  DIRECTIVES  The  first,  HSPD-­‐10,  addressed  the  needs  of  biodefense  in  the  twenty-­‐first  century.  1  Specifically,  this  directive  acknowledged  the  launch  of  the  Proliferative  Security  Initiative  to  curb  the  international  trafficking  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction;  established  the  BioWatch  program  to  detect  the  use  of  biological  weapons  in  U.S.  cities;  expanded  the  Strategic  National  Stockpile;  launched  project  BioShield;  provided  funds  to  improve  state  and  local  health  system  capabilities;  and,  most  importantly  in  my  view,  increased  funding  for  bioterrorism  research  within  the  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services.  HSPD-­‐10  
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also  contained  provisions  for  “the  pillars  of  national  biodefense”  which  include  threat  awareness,  prevention  and  protection,  surveillance  and  detection,  and  response  and  recovery.    The  second  directive,  HSPD-­‐18,  specifically  addressed  the  need  for  “focused  development  of  agent-­‐specific  medical  countermeasures”  for  chemical,  biological,  radiologic,  and  nuclear  (CBRN)  emergencies.  2  The  directive  proposed  a  multi-­‐agency,  multi-­‐sector  strategic  plan  for  production  of  such  countermeasures  and  streamlined  industrial  collaboration.  With  specific  regard  to  biological  threats,  the  directive  also  addressed  the  need  for  unique  countermeasures  to  combat  not  only  traditional  agents  such  as  anthrax  and  plague,  but  also  enhanced  agents,  emerging  agents,  and  novel/advanced  pathogens.    The  most  recent  directive,  HSPD-­‐21,  built  upon  the  provisions  in  HSPD-­‐10  to  enhance  public  health  and  medical  preparedness  for  biological  attacks  and  other  disasters.  3  It  identifies  biosurveillance,  countermeasure  distribution,  mass  casualty  care,  and  community  resilience  as  “critical  components”  of  public  health  and  medical  preparedness  and  offers  implementation  actions  for  those  components.  Most  importantly,  this  directive  recognizes  the  urgency  of  establishing  the  discipline  of  disaster  health  in  the  public  health  and  medical  communities,  a  field  which  is  still  in  its  infancy.    The  directives  outlined  above  have  accomplished  many  goals  in  biodefense  and  public  health  preparedness  over  the  last  few  years,  and  homeland  security  has  benefited  from  collaborations  with  other  federal  agencies,  state  and  local  agencies,  and  the  private  sector.  In  my  opinion,  the  greatest  and  most  visible  result  of  these  collaborations  is  the  dramatically  enhanced  research  involving  emerging  infections  and  biodefense  in  the  United  States.  This  increase  in  research  activity  can  best  be  demonstrated  by  comparing  the  number  of  high-­‐level  biomedical  laboratories  prior  to  the  renewed  interest  in  preventing  bioterrorist  threats  and  after.    LABORATORY  PROLIFERATION  The  U.S.  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services  defines  four  biosafety  levels  (BSL)  for  laboratory  activities  involving  infectious  microorganisms.  4  They  are  designated  in  ascending  order  by  the  degree  of  protection  required  to  safely  work  with  the  agents.  BSL-­‐1  laboratories  involve  well-­‐characterized  agents  not  known  to  cause  disease  in  healthy  adults  and  require  no  additional  safeguards  beyond  standard  microbiological  practices.  Labs  operating  at  the  BSL-­‐2  level  involve  agents  that  may  cause  human  disease  and  therefore  utilize  additional  precautions  and  protective  equipment.  BSL-­‐3  laboratories  contain  agents  that  pose  serious  or  lethal  health  hazards  to  humans  and  must  utilize  even  more  restrictive  practices  and  protective  equipment.  The  highest  level,  BSL-­‐4,  involves  extremely  transmissible  and  highly  lethal  agents  for  which  there  may  not  be  a  vaccine  or  standard  treatment.  BSL-­‐3  and  BSL-­‐4  laboratories  are  most  relevant  to  this  discussion.    In  October  2007,  the  United  States  Government  Accountability  Office  (GAO)  issued  testimony  regarding  oversight  of  the  recent  wave  of  new  BSL-­‐3  and  BSL-­‐4  laboratories.  5  That  testimony  observed  that  the  number  of  BSL-­‐4  labs  has  increased  from  five  before  the  
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2001  terrorist  attacks  to  a  present  number  of  fifteen,  including  at  least  one  in  planning  stage.  For  the  majority  of  the  last  few  decades,  there  were  only  two  facilities  with  such  capabilities:  the  federal  laboratories  at  the  U.S.  Army  Research  Institute  for  Infectious  Diseases  (USAMRIID)  in  Fort  Detrick,  Maryland,  and  at  CDC  in  Atlanta,  Georgia.  In  the  1990s,  three  new  BSL-­‐4  labs  were  built  at  Georgia  State  University,  at  the  National  Institutes  of  Health  in  Bethesda,  Maryland,  and  at  a  private  facility  in  San  Antonio,  Texas.  The  GAO  report  observes  that  since  2001,  at  least  nine  new  facilities  are  either  fully  operational,  in  construction,  or  in  the  planning  process.  Due  to  the  extreme  hazards  of  BSL-­‐4  agents,  they  must  be  handled  by  workers  wearing  protective  space  suits  in  complete  physical,  biological,  and  spatial  isolation  in  negative-­‐pressure  laboratories.  Obviously  such  labs  are  extremely  costly  to  operate,  which  explains  their  relative  scarcity  prior  to  events  in  the  early  twenty-­‐first  century.  The  expansion  of  BSL-­‐3  laboratories  since  2001  has  been  even  more  rapid.  The  GAO  testimony  points  out  that  the  number  of  such  laboratories  is  practically  unknown,  but  more  than  1,300  BSL-­‐3  laboratories  are  currently  registered  with  either  the  CDC  or  the  USDA  under  the  auspices  of  the  Select  Agent  Program  administered  jointly  by  those  agencies.  In  addition,  at  least  forty-­‐six  states  have  one  or  more  state  public  health  BSL-­‐3  facilities  for  diagnostic  and  analytical  purposes  in  support  of  emergency  response.    As  a  consequence  of  the  HSPDs  outlined  above,  the  federal  government  has  poured  billions  of  dollars  into  improving  our  research  capacity  for  defending  the  nation  from  biological  weapons  attacks  and  the  continuing  threat  of  emerging  infectious  diseases.  The  laboratory  expansions  described  in  the  paragraphs  above  are  an  example  of  continued  success  in  this  effort.  It  would  be  unwise,  however,  for  this  rapid  rate  of  laboratory  and  research  expansion  to  continue  without  regulating  these  many  facilities  and  ensuring  the  safety  of  their  employees  and  surrounding  communities.    SAFETY  REGULATION  AND  OVERSIGHT  Occupational  accidents,  equipment  failures,  employee  complacency,  inadequate  standard  operating  procedures,  theft,  environmental  release  of  pathogens,  natural  disasters,  and  terrorist  attacks  are  all  possible  hazards  of  existing  BSL-­‐3  and  BSL-­‐4  laboratories,  and  the  risk  grows  with  every  new  lab  constructed.  The  GAO  testimony  identified  multiple  recent  accidents  at  such  laboratories,  including  failure  to  report  to  CDC  exposures  to  select  agents  in  2006  at  a  laboratory  at  Texas  A&M  University  and  a  power  outage  at  a  BSL-­‐4  facility  at  CDC  in  2007.  It  is  worth  considering  that  these  are  only  a  sample  of  the  reported  laboratory  accidents  and  safety  infractions.  Due  to  the  independent  nature  of  many  of  these  laboratories,  lapses  in  containment  and  security  may  go  unreported  in  order  to  avoid  public  embarrassment  and  guarantee  additional  government  funding.    According  to  the  GAO  testimony,  the  Public  Health  Security  and  Bioterrorism  Preparedness  and  Response  Act  of  2002  made  significant  revisions  to  the  Select  Agent  Program  and  placed  restrictions  on  access  to  select  agents  and  the  facilities  using  them.  CDC  is  responsible  for  the  registration  and  oversight  of  laboratories  that  possess,  use,  or  transfer  select  agents  that  pose  a  threat  to  human  life,  and  USDA  conducts  similar  activities  for  laboratories  that  possess,  use,  or  transfer  select  agents  that  pose  a  threat  to  plants  or  
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animals.  However,  no  single  federal  agency  has  an  official  mission  to  track  the  number  and  activities  of  high-­‐level  research  laboratories.  According  to  a  survey  implemented  by  the  GAO  and  discussed  in  the  testimony  cited  above,  a  number  of  agencies  (including  the  Department  of  Defense,  OSHA,  the  State  Department,  and  EPA)  have  a  need  to  track  the  number  and  activities  of  a  subset  of  such  laboratories  that  directly  support  their  missions,  but  none  is  responsible  for  determining  the  aggregate  risks  associated  with  the  recent  proliferation.  According  to  the  GAO  testimony  and  federal  agency  officials,  oversight  of  these  BSL-­‐3  and  BSL-­‐4  facilities  is  fragmented  and  relies  primarily  on  self-­‐policing.    We  should  be  aware  that  lapses  in  biosecurity  may  have  consequences  beyond  the  occasional  employee  illness  or  environmental  contamination.  According  to  CDC,  there  is  a  baseline  level  of  risk  associated  with  any  high-­‐containment  scenario.  With  the  decentralized  expansion  of  BSL-­‐3  and  BSL-­‐4  laboratories  these  risks  are  sure  to  increase.  Even  labs  with  sophisticated  security  and  containment  procedures  have  experienced  safety  failures,  such  as  the  Brucella  exposure  incident  at  Texas  A&M  University  in  2006.  6  The  GAO  testimony  highlights  that  since  the  full  extent  of  the  recent  expansion  is  not  known,  it  is  unclear  how  the  federal  government  will  create  sufficient  capacity  to  regulate  the  growing  network  of  facilities.    Ensuring  the  long-­‐term  capacity  to  safeguard  our  network  of  biodefense  research  laboratories  will  not  be  a  simple  task.  The  long  list  of  federal,  state,  and  private  stakeholder  agencies  involved  in  this  endeavor  should  consider  delegating  the  responsibility  for  tracking  BSL-­‐3  and  BSL-­‐4  expansion  to  a  single  agency,  or  perhaps  creating  a  multi-­‐agency  clearinghouse  with  a  specific  mission  to  monitor  these  activities.  Additionally,  there  should  be  a  coordinated  effort  by  these  agencies  to  develop  a  national  research  agenda  for  studying  select  agents.  This  action  would  not  only  result  in  a  more  efficient  and  productive  national  biodefense  research  initiative,  but  also  a  safer  national  biodefense  research  initiative.  Having  twenty  laboratories  investigating  anthrax  virulence  factors  might  generate  more  publications  and  disseminate  knowledge  more  rapidly,  but  the  distribution  of  so  many  samples  of  a  high-­‐priority  select  agent  could  pose  an  elevated  aggregate  risk  for  lapses  in  safety  and  security  precautions.  The  responsible  agencies  should  resolve  to  maximize  the  potential  of  our  nation’s  research  facilities  while  ensuring  a  maximum  level  of  preparedness  and  security  infrastructure.    CONCLUSION  I  conclude  this  essay  by  referring  to  the  classic  example  of  laboratory  disaster,  an  episode  in  human  history  that  to  most  people  is  only  a  ghost  memory.  In  1979  in  Sverdlovsk,  Soviet  Union  (now  Yekaterinburg,  Russia),  ninety-­‐four  people  became  infected  with  anthrax,  sixty-­‐four  of  whom  died  over  a  period  of  six  weeks.  Although  the  cause  of  this  strange  outbreak  was  denied  for  years  by  the  Soviet  Union,  it  eventually  became  clear  that  anthrax  spores  had  accidentally  been  released  into  the  air  from  a  nearby  military  research  facility.  7    When  research  of  this  importance  is  conducted,  every  effort  must  be  made  to  ensure  the  safety  and  security  of  both  the  research  entity  as  well  as  the  surrounding  community.  We  have  taken  so  many  steps  in  the  right  direction  over  the  last  five  or  six  years,  we  are  bound  
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to  take  a  few  backwards.  Given  the  urgency  of  matters  related  to  biological  terrorism  and  the  adolescent  nature  of  disaster  preparedness  in  the  United  States,  we  must  make  sure  that  our  gains  do  not  make  us  more  vulnerable.                                                                                                                              
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